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THE SEC MANAGEMENT FRAUD PROGRAM 
Russell B. Stevenson* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Before I discuss the management fraud program and its impli-
cations, I would like to make some general observations about the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCP A). 1 What we are talking about 
is a statute, some means of enforcing it, and possible legislative 
changes. I am struck by how this statute, its genesis, its imple-
mentation and enforcement, and now efforts to amend it represent 
a marvelous example of the legal process at work. The manage-
ment fraud program started with a political scandal, investigated 
by the Justice Department, which perked up some ears at the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission, which in turn launched a 
series of its own investigations that led to the opening of a Pan-
dora's Box whose existence was unsuspected by anyone involved. 
The resulting political reaction led very quickly to the passage of 
the FCP A, a statute that everyone agrees suffers from some 
drafting problems and, therefore, some interpretational problems. 
You have heard how the ABA and representatives of the SEC 
have uttered conflicting interpretations. 
What is interesting about all this is that it is all part of the 
law. What an ABA committee says a statute means, after numerous 
drafts and approvals up the chain of the ABA hierarchy, is law in 
a very real sense. By the same token, a speech by the Chairman of 
the SEC, or the Director of the Enforcement Division, putting a 
gloss on the statute is also law. After all, law is nothing more than 
a set of rules and interpretations of those rules that affect the way 
people behave, and what the ABA and the Chairman of the SEC 
say a statute means are both important in deciding the way people 
behave. With the philosophical introduction to what we are about 
here tonight, let me turn to the topic of our discussion. 
* Professor of Law, George Washington University, National Law Center; Attor-
ney-Fellow, Office of the General Counsel, Securities and Exchange Commission. 
1. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, §§ 102-104, 91 Stat. 
1494 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a, 78m, 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78ff (Supp. V 1981)), reprinted in Ap-
pendix I infra. 
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II. THE MANAGEMENT FRAUD PROGRAM 
I have never quite understood where the term management 
fraud came from. I am told that it was coined by Stanley Sporkin, 
the Director of the Enforcement Division of the SEC. It has 
always struck me as something of a misnomer to say that the pay-
ment of bribes by a corporation involves "management fraud." 
Whatever its name, however, the management fraud program 
is not without its significance today, even though the passage of 
the FCP A has rendered moot many of the issues that the program 
raised in the mid-1970s. To illustrate the importance of understand-
ing the law developed prior to the management fraud cases, one 
need only refer to a more recent matter that has generated a cer-
tain amount of controversy; the decision of the SEC not to bring 
an action against Citicorp to compel it to correct certain filings 
with the Commission that failed to describe certain practices in 
connection with its foreign currency trading. 
A. The 1981 Citicorp Matter 
The staff of the Enforcement Division recommended to the 
Commission in December of 1981 that the Commission institute pro-
ceeding against Citicorp, the holding company of Citibank, alleging 
that Citicorp had violated the disclosure requirements of the securi-
ties laws by failing to disclose that several of its branches had en-
gaged in what were called "parking transactions" in their interna-
tional exchange operations. These parking transactions involved a 
practice whereby a branch, for example in Brussels, that was en-
gaging in foreign exchange transactions found itself at the end of 
the day holding more of some currency that Belgian law permitted. 
Apparently one of the ways that the Brussels branch would handle 
that situation was to "sell" a portion of its possession to another 
branch, most often either in Nassau or New York in order that the 
position would be off the books of the Brussels Bank branch. The 
price at which these parking transactions took place was set artifi-
cially, sometimes outside the range of market prices. The effect 
was that the Brussels branch could shift profits to Nassau, where 
the effective tax rate was lower than in Belgium. There was also 
questions about whether Belgian banking and currency control 
regulations were violated. Similar patterns of transactions took 
place at several foreign branches. To make a long story short, the 
thrust of the allegations in the staff report on the matter was that 
Citibank and, ultimately, Citicorp were engaged in transactions 
2
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 9, No. 2 [1982], Art. 10
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol9/iss2/10
1982] SEC Management Fraud 341 
that may have violated the law in a number of foreign countries. 
Significantly, it was never adjudicated in any judicial or adminis-
trative forum that any of these transactions violated any law, but 
some of them may have. 
The staff of the Enforcement Division said the practice of en-
gaging in this sort of dealing should have been disclosed to the 
shareholders. The case was reminiscent of the foreign payments 
cases, although in those cases corporations did pay bribes to for-
eign officials overseas that clearly violated the domestic law of the 
countries in which the bribes were paid. In a very unusual devel-
opment, the Director of the Enforcement Divison filed a dissenting 
recommendation, disagreeing with the recommendation of his 
staff. The Office of General Counsel and the Division of Corpora-
tion Finance filed another memorandum also recommending that 
the case not be brought. The Commission ultimately decided not 
to bring the enforcement action. 
B. Theories of Enforcement 
On message of all this is that the same legal theories used by 
the SEC in the management fraud cases are at issue in the Citicorp 
matter, which has attracted much attention both in the press and 
among the securities bar. What then were the theories under 
which the management fraud cases were brought and to what ex-
tent are those theories still valid? There was a certain lack of clari-
ty in those theories at the time the management fraud cases were 
brought, a lack of clarity that has echoes in subsequent judicial 
proceedings related to those cases. 
One can begin the discussion with an introduction to what the 
securities law do, in fact, require. The basic reporting require-
ments of the securities laws are found in SEC regulations govern-
ing the content of periodic reports filed by publicly-held issuers 
with the Commission. These requirements do not mandate simply 
that a company report all material developments; that would be 
much too open-ended. The result would be infinite speculation 
about whether this or that fact is or is not material. Instead, the 
forms promulgated by the Commission specify in some detail what 
must be disclosed in so-called "line items." A failure to disclose a 
material fact called for by a line item violates the statute. A sec-
ond obligation arises out of the requirement that what is disclosed 
must not be misleading because it omits facts necessary to tell the 
whole truth. 
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It could be argued, then, that the allegedly improper behavior 
of various Citibank branches had to be disclosed because it fell 
within some line item. But no line item specifically calls for infor-
mation of this sort. The next question is whether some statement 
actually made was incomplete and therefore misleading. The argu-
ment was made that there are implied representations in any filing 
with the SEC, including the representation that management is 
honest and would not permit the company to violate the law. 
Finally, it is clear that in many of the management fraud cases, 
the illegal payments were material in a traditional, economic 
sense. That is, if a company doing business abroad was procuring 
a large part of its business by paying bribes which created the 
risk that the business would be lost if the bribes were uncovered, 
it could be said quite properly that the bribery was a material fact 
that should be disclosed to shareholders. Otherwise the state-
ments in disclosure documents about sales, income et cetera, 
would be misleading. 
One of the most interesting aspects of this problem is the ap-
plication of the concept of materiality to illegal or improper be-
havior by management. It is clear that some kinds of management 
conduct can be quantitatively material, in the sense, for example, 
that a foreign bribe can jeopardize a material amount of business. 
There is another notion, that of "qualitative materiality," that 
poses somewhat more difficult problems. Qualitative materiality 
grows out of the idea that it is important to shareholders to know 
that their management is honest. 
This problem can be broken into three different kinds of 
cases. The first involves a management that is stealing from the 
company. In general, the courts have been willing to hold that 
such conduct is material to shareholders. 
In the second kind of case, which is a little bit more difficult, a 
member of management has been adjudicated to have done some-
thing wrong. Determining that there is a disclosure obligation in 
such cases is usually relatively easy, because there is usually a 
line item that requires the reporting of recent convictions of wrong-
doing by officers or directors of a sort relevant to their honesty in 
business affairs. 
The third class of conduct is what might be called unadjudi-
cated illegal conduct- that is, conduct that is illegal, but with re-
spect to which no court or administrative tribunal has ever found 
there to have been a violation of law. To say that such conduct 
must be disclosed is to say that the management of a corporation 
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would be required to file a statement with the SEC accusing itself 
of doing something wrong. 
That is obviously not going to happen in real life. Thus a dis-
closure requirement with respect to such conduct is merely to 
turn into a violation of the securities laws activities that already 
viol~te some other law. The only justification for such a rule is 
that the existing mechanisms for enforcing the law whose viola-
tion is said to give rise to a disclosure obligation are inadequate, 
and that it is preferable to rely on the enforcement of the 
securities laws to supplement the primary law enforcement mech-
anism rather than to improve that mechanism more directly. 
What can one say about such a theory? I hesitate to quote 
myself, but do not know a more direct response to the question. 
Back in 1975, I wrote: 
There is hardly any question that the SEC would be more 
capable of enforcing a ban on foreign bribery than any other ob-
vious candidate for the job. But it nevertheless appears that the 
Commission would be a somewhat reluctant dragon in that role, to 
say the least. And, in the final analysis, it is probably not ter-
ribly well suited, in its present form, to take on the task. Indeed, 
so far is the policing of the overseas activities of American cor-
porations from the Commission's traditional activities that, rea-
soning simply from institutional function, it would appear equal-
ly rational to give the job to the FTC, or the Anti-trust Division, 
or perhaps the Occupational Safety and Health Administration. 
They are all, after all, in the business of enforcing laws dealing 
with corporate behavior. 
But the world is not so rational as all that; and it appears 
completely obvious to the involved, unobjective observer (in-
cluding anyone who reads this journal) that the SEC is the one 
game in town. Which it is. And so it is that _Congress, and it 
would seem the American people, continue to force the job of 
regulating corporate behavior onto an understaffed agency that 
persists in viewing the world through disclosure-colored glasses 
-with the result that the agency grown ever more schizophre-
nic. And so it will continue until Congress, and the American 
people, eventually awaken to the fact that they are sending a 
company of infantry (though a brave and willing one) out after an 
armored battalion and finally make the difficult decision whether 
to retrain the company and give it some tanks or to send it 
another unit.2 
2. Stevenson, The SEC and Foreign Bribery, 32 Bus. LAW. 53, 72 (1976). 
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